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THERE ARE NO RACISTS HERE: THE RISE OF RACIAL
EXTREMISM, WHEN NO ONE IS RACIST
Jeannine Bell*
ABSTRACT
At first glance hate murders appear wholly anachronistic in post-racial America.
This Article suggests otherwise.  The Article begins by analyzing the periodic ex-
pansions of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the protection for racist expres-
sion in First Amendment doctrine.  The Article then contextualizes the case law
by providing evidence of how the First Amendment works on the ground in two
separate areas —the enforcement of hate crime law and on university campuses that
enact speech codes.  In these areas, those using racist expression receive full protec-
tion for their beliefs.  Part III describes social spaces—social media and employ-
ment where slurs and epithets may be used frequently.  The final portion of the
Article briefly explores two forms of unacknowledged racial violence—violence di-
rected at minorities who move to white neighborhoods and extremist killings.  Our
inaccurate approach to bias-motivated crime and the culture of protection around
racist expression, the Article concludes, leaves American society vulnerable to the
danger created by racial extremists.
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INTRODUCTION
All of the racists have died out. There are several powerful examples
illustrative of the idea that in contemporary America, no one is a racist.
NBA Clippers owner Donald Sterling, whose remarks led the NBA to
take the unprecedented action of banning him from NBA ownership, ve-
hemently denies that he is a racist.1 David Duke, one time Louisiana gu-
bernatorial candidate and former Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan,
denies that he is a racist.2 In avowedly denying that they are racist, Duke
and Sterling are not alone. Cross burners and others accused of commit-
ting hate crimes also claim they are not racists.3 The first defense of those
accused of hate crimes seems to be to deny that they are racist.4 When did
racism get such a bad name?
Despite the current trend to disavow racism, there are some individu-
als whose racism seems unassailable—racial extremists who select and mur-
der their victims because of their race. Some of these hate murders are
committed by zealots who commit these acts as part of a white supremacist
plan.5  Others seem less scripted.  For example in the early morning of
June 26, 2011, a group of white men in Brandon, Mississippi were looking
1. Catherine E. Shoichet and Steve Almasy, CNN exclusive: Donald Sterling insists he’s no
racist, still slams Magic Johnson, CNN (May 13, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/12/us/
donald-sterling-interview.
2. See, e.g., Edgar Johnson, Exposing the Real Racists: A Review of Dr Duke’s “Jewish
Supremacism,” DAVIDDUKE.COM (Dec. 26, 2013, 12:33 AM), http://davidduke.com/exposing-
the-real-racists-a-review-of-dr-dukes-jewish-supremacism/ (describing Duke’s belief that others
are, “the real racists”).
3. See Jeannine Bell, O Say, Can You See: Free Expression by the Light of Fiery Crosses, 39
HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV.  335, 370 (2004) (describing cases in which the defendant burden
cross as a joke or prank).
4. See, e.g., Kevin Sullivan, Mark Berman & Sarah Kaplan, Three Muslims killed in shooting
near UNC; police, family argue over motive, THE WASHINGTON POST, (Feb. 11, 2015), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/02/11/three-killed-in-shooting-near-
university-of-north-carolina/ (family asserting that suspect shot three Muslim students because of
a dispute over parking, not because of their religion); Lailia Kearney, California student charged
with hate crime enters not-guilty plea, REUTERS, (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2014/01/07/us-usa-california-hatecrime-idUSBREA0604G20140107 (lawyer for a white stu-
dent at San Jose State University accused of taunting African-American roommate with racial
slurs and attempting to hang a bicycle lock around his neck last fall describes his client as “not a
racist” ).
5. See, e.g., Bill Dedham, Midwest Gunman Had Engaged in Racist Acts at 2 Universities,
N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/06/us/midwest-gunman-had-
engaged-in-racist-acts-at-2-universities.html. (Describing the killing spree of Benjamin Smith,
devotee of the World Church of the Creator),
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for a group of African Americans to harass and assault.6  On some occa-
sions they had pelted African Americans with beer bottles.7  They liked to
select intoxicated African Americans, and so chose James Craig Anderson,
because he was African American and they believed had been drinking.8
Several men punched Anderson and he fell to the ground, where one of
the men struck Anderson in the face several times.9  As Anderson was
lying on the ground, the men got back in their truck and the driver, Deryl
Paul Dedmon deliberately ran over Anderson, causing injuries which
killed him.10
This Article explores the presence of racial extremism in the context
of the social disavowal of expressions of racism. At first glance, racial ex-
tremism, seems like an outlier—something wholly anachronistic in a
“post-racial” world.  In the Article, I suggest otherwise, outlining the sur-
prising supports for this disturbing phenomenon.  In Part I of the Article, I
discuss protections for racist expression in First Amendment doctrine.  In
Part II, how the First Amendment works in several areas to allow those
using racist expression to receive full protection for their beliefs.  In Part
III, I address examples of social spaces—social media and employment
where slurs and epithets may be used frequently.  In Part IV, the final
portion of the article, I briefly explore two largely unexamined but perni-
cious forms of racial violence—violence directed at minorities who move
to white neighborhoods and extremist killings.  I argue that our inaccurate
approach to bias-motivated crime and the culture of protection we have
created around racist expression leaves American society vulnerable to the
threats created by racial extremists.  The Article concludes with a call for
increased attention to extremist and other less recognized types of bias-
motivated violence.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RACIST SPEECH
A. State Regulation Given a Wide Berth
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides: “Congress
shall make no law abridging freedom of speech, or the press; or the right
of people to peacefully assemble . . . .”11  Americans may think of the First
Amendment as having always provided clear protection for racist speech,
6. Dept of Justice Press Release, Mississippi Man Pleads Guilty for Conspiring to Com-
mit Hate Crimes Against African-Americans in Jackson, Mississippi (Jan. 3, 2010), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/mississippi-man-pleads-guilty-conspiring-commit-hate-crimes-against
-african-americans-jackson.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. U.S. Const. amend. I.
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irrespective of either speaker or context.12  This characterization ignores
some of the Court’s first pronouncements in the area of racist speech. In its
first several examinations of racist speech, the Supreme Court allowed
states to regulate racist speech.13 The Court’s first examination of organi-
zations using racist speech, Bryant v. Zimmerman, in 1928 involved a Ku
Klux Klan member’s challenge to a New York law that required all groups
with twenty or more members to register with the state.14 Bryant, a mem-
ber of the Buffalo Provisional Klan of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan was
charged under a New York statute for having attended meetings held by an
unregistered organization.15 Bryant argued that by not exempting the Ku
Klux Klan (as were labor unions and other benevolent organizations), the
statute violated the equal protection clause.16 The Supreme Court dis-
agreed. Looking to the Ku Klux Klan’s history of violence and desire to
preserve white supremacy, the Court concluded that the distinction made
in the statute was appropriate.17
In 1942, the Court created a category of unprotected speech into
which hate speech could fall.  In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,18 Chaplin-
sky, a Jehovah’s Witness, was charged and subsequently convicted of call-
ing a police officer a “God damned racketeer” and a “damned Fascist.”19
Chaplinsky had violated a New Hampshire statute prohibiting the public
use of “offensive, derisive or annoying words.”20 Appealing his conviction,
Chaplinsky argued that the statute violated the Fourteenth and First
Amendments.21 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the statute
was a valid exercise of police power because it was designed to punish
breaches of the peace caused by a new category of words, “fighting
words,” which “by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace.”22
12. See generally, Jeannine Bell, Restraining the Heartless: Racist Speech and Minority Rights,
84 IND. L.J. 963 (2009) (comparing American jurisprudence on racist speech with that several
European countries).
13. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
14. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. at 71. Though it was decided before the development of the
modern First Amendment jurisprudence, Bryant is nevertheless understood by scholars in the
area to be a case concerning racist speech. See, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER, HATE SPEECH: THE
HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN CONTROVERSY 26 (1994).
15. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. at 71.
16. Id. at 73.
17. Id. at 76-77.
18. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568.
19. Id. at 569.
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 572-73.
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A decade after Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court rendered the last deci-
sion in its line of early cases expressing support for restrictions on racist
speech: Beauharnais v. Illinois.23 In 1952, the Court rejected a challenge to
an Illinois statute by Joseph Beauharnais, the founder of the White Circle
League of America.24 The White Circle League was created to help white
residents of Chicago neighborhoods resist housing integration.25 Beauhar-
nais was convicted for having distributed flyers containing racist language
in violation of an Illinois statute26 which criminalized the public distribu-
tion of publications which “portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or
lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion”
which “exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to con-
tempt, derision, or obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace
or riots . . .”27 The flyer distributed exhorted: “The forces of Interracial-
ism that are destroying white neighborhoods will ultimately destroy our
White racial identity.”28 It called for the white people of Chicago to or-
ganize or risk dire consequences, stating, “If persuasion and the need to
prevent the white race from becoming mongrelized by the Negro will not
unite us, then the aggressions . . . rapes, robberies, knives, guns and mari-
juana of the Negro, surely will.”29
Beauharnais challenged the Illinois statute, arguing that it was uncon-
stitutionally vague and violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.30
The Supreme Court relied on its decision in Chaplinsky and Cantwell v.
State of Connecticut maintaining, “Resort to epithets or personal abuse is
not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safe-
guarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would
raise no question under that instrument.”31 It also examined Illinois’s his-
tory of violent race riots, concluding that the state had a right to punish
groups in the manner proscribed by the statute.32  It was not certain to the
Court that the statute would prevent the type of ills that it had in mind
when the statute was passed.33  The Court concluded that the state of Illi-
nois had the power under the Constitution to address the problem, even if
its solution was not guaranteed to work.
23. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
24. Id.
25. See id. at 252.
26. 38 ILL. REV. STAT. § 471 (1949).
27. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 251 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. § 4711).
28. Id. at 276 (Black, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 252.
30. See id. at 251-52.
31. Id. at 256-57 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940).
32. See id. at 258-61.
33. Id. at 262.
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B. Limiting State Regulation
In many ways, the Court’s decision in Beauharnais was the high water
mark for the Supreme Courts’ allowing state regulation of racist speech.34
Fast forward forty years, however, and the Court is much more wary of the
states’ intentions, and much less willing to allow it free rein to respond to
racist speech.35 In R.A.V. v. St. Paul, in a decision by Justice Scalia, the
Supreme Court struck down the conviction of a skinhead who burned a
cross on a Black family’s lawn.  The skinhead, “R.A.V.” had been con-
victed under a statute punishing bias-motivated speech that the Court ulti-
mately found to violate the First Amendment.36 The statute at issue was
St. Paul’s Bias-Motivated Crime ordinance.37 The ordinance provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not lim-
ited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or
has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resent-
ment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.38
In sharp contrast to the approach taken by the Court in Beauharnais,
where the Court reflected on Chicago’s sordid history of race riots,
Scalia’s opinion in R.A.V. mentions neither the statutory history which
led to the creation of the St. Paul ordinance nor did he cite the campaign
of terror directed at the Jones family, the Black family on whose lawn
R.A.V. burned a cross.39  Though Scalia failed to mention it, as in Beau-
harnais, the ordinance at issue in R.A.V. was created in response to a seri-
ous threat.40 The ordinance’s history actually had nothing to do with the
sort of situation in which R.A.V. was prosecuted.41  According to the
34. See id. at 258, 262.
35. See, e.g., R.AV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (2010) (striking down a statute
attempting to punish bias-motivated speech).
36. See id.
37. ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990).
38. Id.
39. See R.AV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379.  Scalia’s discussion of the incident
that prompted the case just two sentences long: “In the predawn hours of June 21, 1990, peti-
tioner and several other teenagers allegedly assembled a crudely made cross by taping together
broken chair legs. They then allegedly burned the cross inside the fenced yard of a black family
that lived across the street from the house where petitioner was staying.”; see also Bell, O Say,
Can You See, supra note 3 at 335-337 (a fuller discussion of the incident).
40. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 253 (1952). (“The statute before us is not a
catchall enactment left at large by the State court which applied it . . . It is a law specifically
directed at a defined evil, its language drawing from history and practice in Illinois . . .”).
41. When first created, the ordinance didn’t even include race because it was crafted in
response to the synagogue attacks. In the early 1980s gender was added to the statute and in the
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prosecutor in the case, Tom Foley, the city had created the original ordi-
nance in the early 1970s after many of the city’s synagogues were under
attack.42
The city had further reason to believe that the ordinance might be
upheld: in its response to R.A.V.’s First Amendment challenge, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court interpreted the ordinance to regulate “fighting
words,” which in Chaplinsky the Court had decided were a category of
speech lacking First Amendment protection.43 The Supreme Court was
limited to this particular construction.44  The Minnesota Supreme Court
also held that the ordinance was narrowly tailored to address a compelling
government interest: protecting the community against possible violence
and disorder.45  The threat to violence and disorder were real in this par-
ticular case.  As the first Black family to move to a white neighborhood,
the Jones’ had been subject to a campaign of terror prior to the cross
burning.46
Despite this history that was strikingly similar to that which had led
to the creation of the ordinance the Court had upheld in Beauharnais, in
R.A.V., the Court struck down the St. Paul ordinance.47 In doing so,
Justice Scalia insisted that the First Amendment prohibited the city from
using that particular statute to regulate fighting words.48 Of course, under
the Court’s decision in Chaplinsky fighting words as a category were not
protected speech.49 The problem with the statute, according to the major-
ity opinion, was that the city had chosen to regulate only a subset of fight-
ing words—those that provoked violence on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion, or gender.50 In regulating only a subset of fighting words, Scalia
argued, the city had chosen to “impose special prohibitions on those
speakers who express views on disfavored subjects.”51 According to Justice
Scalia, invective on other topics such as political affiliation, union mem-
late 1980s race was added. Laura Lederer, The Prosecutor’s Dilemma, An Interview with Tom Foley,
in THE PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND POR-
NOGRAPHY 194, 196 (Laura Lederer & Richard Delgado, eds., 1995).
42. Id.
43. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991).
44. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992).
45. Id.
46. Laura Lederer, The Case of the Cross Burning: an interview with Russ and Laura Jones, in
THE PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND POR-
NOGRAPHY 30 (Laura Lederer & Richard Delgado, eds., 1995).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
50. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 391 (2010).
51. Id. at 391.
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bership, and homosexuality were not prohibited, thereby signaling the
state’s disfavoring of the views expressed on a narrow set of subjects.52
In a departure from both the Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis,
and that made by the Court in earlier cases like Chaplinsky and Beauharnais,
the majority did not accept the city’s argument that the St. Paul statute
could prevent violence and disorder.53 The city had argued that it was not
trying to regulate disfavored topics but rather the intent of the statute was
to “protect against the victimization of a person or persons who are partic-
ularly vulnerable because of their membership in a group that historically
has been discriminated against.”54 In making this argument, the city was
suggesting that the ordinance was aimed at regulating their secondary ef-
fects of the speech. The majority in R.A.V., with no evidence of discrimi-
natory legislative intent or history, rejected this argument.55 Justice Scalia
made no attempt to distinguish Chaplinsky and Beauharnais, which had
clearly attempted to regulate speech in a similar manner.56 Instead, Justice
Scalia maintained that the statute in R.A.V. regulated the primary effects
of speech—not the secondary effects—noting, “As we said in Boos v.
Barry . . .  ‘Listeners’ reactions to speech are not the type of ‘secondary
effects’ we referred to in Renton. . . .  The emotive impact of speech on its
audience is not a ‘secondary effect.’”57
C. Grudging Acceptance For Modest Regulation
The Court’s decision in R.A.V. reverberated around the country. In
the wake of the decision, citing R.A.V., state courts in Washington, South
Carolina, Maryland, Virginia, and New Jersey held cross burning statutes
unconstitutional.58 The year after the decision, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court invalidated its hate crime statute in response to a First Amendment
challenge.59 The challenge to the Wisconsin penalty enhancement statute
was brought by Todd Mitchell, a Black man who had been convicted
under the statute for encouraging others to attack Gregory Reddick, a
white youth.60 Wisconsin’s hate crime penalty enhancement statute pro-
vided that penalties for crimes against victims or property intentionally
selected because of race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, na-
52. Id.
53. Id. at 393-94. Violence and disorder, of course, were secondary effects of the speech
the Court had earlier allowed the city to regulate in Beauharnais. The primary effects of the
speech were the immediate reaction that the speech provokes.
54. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 394.
55. Id. at 394.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 394.
58. See Bell, O Say, Can You See, supra note 3 (discussing further the succession of state
supreme court cases invalidating cross burning statutes following the R.A.V. decision).
59. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
60. Id. at 481.
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tional origin or ancestry of the individual attacked could be increased.61 A
jury found that Mitchell had chosen Reddick because of his race and his
sentence was increased from two to four years.62
In its consideration of Mitchell, the Supreme Court upheld Mitchell’s
conviction under Wisconsin’s hate crime penalty enhancement.63 In
Mitchell, the Court held that the use of racial motivation as an aggravating
factor did not in fact violate the First Amendment, as the defendant had
contended.64  The justification for this was that hate crime penalty en-
hancement statutes criminalized that racial motivation which the Court
denied was part of racist expression.  This reasoning was similar to that
used by the Court in a 1983 case Barclay v. Florida.65 In Barclay, the Court
had approved the use of the defendant’s racial motivation in allowing the
defendant to be eligible for the death penalty.66
The Court continued its sideways approach to regulating racist ex-
pression in Mitchell in the next hate speech case it took, Virginia v. Black.
In Black the Court chose to revisit cross burning, this time considering an
appeal by the Commonwealth of Virginia after its cross burning statute had
been struck down on First Amendment grounds.67 Black was an appeal of
three cross burning cases that had been consolidated by the Virginia Su-
preme Court.68 The Virginia Supreme Court struck down Virginia’s cross
burning statute because it found that the statute was focused on cross burn-
ing and therefore, was “analytically indistinguishable” from the statute
struck down by the court in R.A.V.69 In Black the Court likened burning
a cross to other true threats allowing states to regulate cross burnings when
undertaken with an intent to intimidate.70
Because R.A.V. was not overruled by the Court, both Black and
Mitchell must be read as very narrow acceptances of a state’s ability to regu-
late racist expression. In Black, the ability to prohibit cross burnings is lim-
61. Id. at 480.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 490.
64. Id. at 479.
65. Barclay v. United States, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (plurality opinion).  In deciding that the
state of Wisconsin could criminalize the motivation that the defendant had used, the court in
Mitchell was doing something quite different than it had in Beauharnais.  In Beauharnais the Court
accepted that the importance of the issue was so great that a state was justified in regulating
expression.  In Mitchell, the Court rejects the argument that a physical assault is expressive con-
duct protected by the First Amendment. 508 U.S. 476. 484.
66. Id. at 949. The Court also analogized to other types of situations such as murder for
hire as situations in which the motivation for the crime could be punished.
67. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 343. (2003).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 344.
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ited to those cross burnings undertaken with intent to intimidate.71 The
Court goes out of its way in Black to explicitly protect cross burnings as
statements of ideology, as signs of group solidarity or as statements under-
taken for artistic expression.72 Though the Court discusses at length the
historical use of cross burning,73 little mention is made in the opinion of
the effect of cross burnings on those targeted. The effects of cross burnings
on targets, which are clearly documented, do not constitute a justification
for state regulation.74 This has significant implications for states’ ability to
deal with the deleterious effects of cross burning. Consider the following
hypothetical: If a Ku Klux Klan group, say the Eastern Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan, decides to burn crosses solely as a member of group solidarity,
they may argue that there is no wish to intimidate anyone.  Though such
events could terrify African Americans and other minorities living in the
area, under Supreme Court’s reasoning in Black, prosecution against the
group should fail.
Like Black, Mitchell also must be read as fairly narrow support for
state’s ability to regulate racist expression because the case involved a chal-
lenge to a hate crime penalty enhancement law. In other words, unlike
Beauharnais, the statute involved required the commission of a criminal act
s motivated by bias. According to the Court’s decision in Mitchell the stat-
ute did not regulate speech per se; rather, the racist expression that Mitchell
allowed the legislature to regulate was the discriminatory selection of vic-
tims on the grounds of race, religion, gender, and other categories.75 Its
basis for this was also narrow, predicated on the state’s ability to regulate
motivation in other sorts of cases, rather than being based on secondary
effects such as the harm that such crimes cause to victims.76
The Court’s justification for allowing regulation of racist expression
in Mitchell and Black differs quite sharply from the Court’s approach in
earlier cases like Beauharnais. Recall that in Beauharnais, the Court noted
the problems of racism—in this case manifested as race riots—and ac-
cepted the argument that racist expression was linked to the particular dis-
order the state was trying to regulate.77 Acknowledging a connection
between racist expression and harm made it possible for the Beauharnais
Court to accept the state’s interest in regulating racist expression, and pro-
vided wide latitude for the state to do so.
71. Id. at 362.
72. Id. at 365-66.
73. Id. at 343-44.
74. Id. at 344. Justice Thomas disagreed with this particular move by the Court. See id. at
388 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Colored Speech: Cross Burnings, Epis-
temics, and the Triumph of the Crits? 93 GEO. L. J. 575, 608-10 (2005).
75. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 480 (1993).
76. Id.
77. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 260-62 (1952).
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The Court took a distinctly different approach to allowing regulation
in Mitchell and Black.  Though it agreed to allow states to regulate cross
burning, the Court refused to overrule R.A.V.78 In striking down the
Minneapolis statute at issue in R.A.V. the Court explicitly rejected the
city’s argument that the ordinance came within one of the specific excep-
tions allowing content discrimination aimed at the secondary effects of
speech.79  In rejecting the City of St. Paul’s argument that the St. Paul
ordinance only regulated secondary effects, the Court cited Boos v. Barry80
insisting, “[L]istener’s reactions to speech are not the type of secondary
effects we referred to in Renton.” The emotive impact of the speech on its
audience is not a secondary effect.”81 By allowing regulation of racist ex-
pression in Mitchell and Black, but leaving R.A.V. in place, the Court
seems to be accepting of the argument that a city has no place regulating
the harm of racist expression.
II. HOW THE FIRST AMENDMENT WORKS ON THE GROUND
A. Enforcement of Hate Crime Law
Among academics who write about the First Amendment there was
significant worry leading up to the decisions in R.A.V. and Mitchell that
regulations on racist speech would lead to individuals being punished sim-
ply for using slurs or epithets.82 Critics reject the Supreme Court’s conten-
tion that hate crimes are predicated on evidence of motivation.83 The use
of racist speech, according to such critics, violates the First Amendment
because “ordinary” criminal laws already exist, and the mere existence of
hate crimes laws signals that they constitute an additional penalty aimed at
78. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 343-44 (2003).
79. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 394 (1992). In Renton v Playtime Theaters
475 U.S. 41, 54, 106 S. Ct. 925, 932, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1986) adult movie theaters challenged a
regulation which restricted the location of adult movie theaters to within 1000 feet of a residen-
tial building, church, school, or park. The Court allowed regulation of expressive content on the
grounds the regulation was aimed at the secondary effects – the serious problems caused by adult
theaters. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986). Trying to invoke
the exception of allowed in Renton, in RAV the city of St. Paul had argued that the ordinance
was intended, “not to impact on the right of free expression of the accused, but rather to protect
against the victimization of a person or persons who are particularly vulnerable because of their
membership in a group that is been historically discriminated against.” 505 U.S. 377, 394.
80. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
81. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 394 (1992).
82. See e.g., Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, but Can Words Increase
Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L. REV.
333 (1991); Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Thought as Freedom of Expression: Hate Crime Sentencing
Enhancement and First Amendment Theory, 11 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS 29 (1992).
83. JAMES B. JACOBS AND KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW & IDEN-
TITY POLITICS 126 (1998).
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racist expression. Hate crime laws therefore, critics insist, punish individu-
als for thinking biased thoughts.84
Critics of hate crime legislation also make empirical claims.85 There
are three main empirical claims made by critics. First, critics often quibble
with the idea that the use of racist speech is any indication of what moti-
vated the crime.86 As one critic of hate crimes legislation writes, “Jurors
cannot read into defendant’s minds to determine whether the acts were
precipitated by bigotry.”87 Critics contend that police will arrest individu-
als for using hate speech, which is protected under R.A.V., rather than for
having committed hate crimes.88 Finally, critics also insist, that such laws
will be used against minority perpetrators of hate crimes.89 Generally, the
support for this last argument is always the same—a story about a Black
man in Florida having been arrested for having committed a hate crime
after he called a white police officer “a cracker.”90 Charges against the man
were dismissed.91
With respect to police officers enforcing the law incorrectly, critics
are correct in thinking that the Supreme Court created significant enforce-
ment difficulties when Mitchell was decided without overruling R.A.V.92
Police officers who enforce hate crime laws must take care not to do so in
a manner that infringes on constitutionally protected speech.93  In Mitchell,
citing Dawson v. Delaware, a case decided the previous year, Justice Rehn-
quist wrote that a sentencing judge could not consider, “a defendant’s ab-
stract beliefs, however obnoxious to most people.”94 Given this
pronouncement by the Court, and the language in R.A.V. protecting ra-
84. “[T]he only additional purpose in punishing more severely those who commit a bias
crime is to provide extra punishment based on the offenders politically incorrect opinions and
viewpoints.” JACOBS AND POTTER, supra note 83, at 128.
85. See Jeannine Bell, Deciding When Hate Is a Crime: The First Amendment, Police Detec-
tives, and the Identification of Hate Crime, 4 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 33, 34 (2002) (describing
critics’ concerns regarding hate crime legislation).
86. See, e.g., Gellman supra note 82, at 101; Redish, supra note 82, at 30.
87. PHYLLIS B. GERSTENFELD, HATE CRIMES: CAUSES, CONTROLS, AND CONTROVER-
SIES, 49 (2011).
88. Gellman, supra note 82, at 364-65.
89. See e.g., Phyllis B. Gerstenfeld, Smile When You Call Me That!: The Problems With
Punishing Hate Motivated Behavior, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 259, 279 (1992).
90. See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 82, at 361 n.134; Gerstenfeld, supra note 89, at 279;
Barbara Dority, The Criminalization of Hatred, 54 HUMANIST 38 (May/June 1994), available at
http://ehostvgw11.epnet.com.
91. Gellman, supra note 82, at 279.
92. Jeannine Bell, Deciding When Hate Is a Crime: The First Amendment, Police Detectives,
and the Identification of Hate Crime, 4 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 33, 46-47 (2002) (describing
practical concerns for enforcement based on the gap between Mitchell and R.A.V.).
93. Id.
94. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) at 485 (citing Dawson v. Delaware, 503
U.S. 159 (1992) at 167).
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cist ideas95 it stands to reason that if police officers are arresting individuals
for the use of racist speech then they are unquestionably in violation of the
First Amendment. The inquiry in cases in which individuals are accused of
having committed hate crimes is what motivated the crime. In other
words, what drove the individual to commit the crime?
Though many critics of hate crime legislation automatically assume
that police fail in their quest to walk the line between hate speech and hate
crime,96 at least one empirical examination of how police actually enforce
bias crime law suggests otherwise. My study of the enforcement of bias
crime law in “Center City,” a large American city, followed police officers
trained in the investigation of hate crimes as they grappled with the com-
plicated First Amendment issues involved in separating hate speech from a
crime.97 Rather than behaving as the overeager enforcers that many critics
predict, officers respected the line between constitutionally protected racist
speech and constitutionally approved regulation of hate crime.98 Though
officers had not been schooled on the specific details of all of the First
Amendment cases on which their work touched, when asked about hate
speech they clearly stated that it was protected.99 They knew that motiva-
tion was the key to what they should be doing.100
One detective was asked how one could tell that a crime was a hate
crime and responded in a way that reflected subtlety:
It’s not language alone. You investigate actions. Words are the
secondary buttress of actions. They proved the history of the
action; prove that they went after someone because of race. You
have to put the blinders on. Is this something the perpetrator
would’ve done if the victim were black or white? You have to
consider both sides, walk the line.101
These statements were bolstered by another of the unit’s detectives
who commented on the relationship between racist speech and the actions
95. Justice Scalia suggested that the Court did not agree with R.AV.’s views, but argued
that the City of St. Paul may not restrict his expression.  “The politicians of St. Paul are entitled
to express that hostility—but not through the means of imposing unique limitations upon speak-
ers who (however benightedly) disagree. Let there be no mistake about our belief that burning a
cross in someone’s front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has sufficient means at its disposal to
prevent such behavior without adding the First Amendment to the fire. “  R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 396, (1992).
96. See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 82, at 359; Redish, supra note 82, at 29, 30. JACOBS &
POTTER, supra note 83, at 109-10.
97. JEANNINE BELL, POLICING HATRED: LAW ENFORCEMENT, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND
HATE CRIME 147 (2002) [hereinafter BELL, POLICING HATRED] .
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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taken by the perpetrator. The detective said, “We look to the totality of
the circumstances, criminal action in the words and also at the incident . . .
language alerts us to the possibility of bias but it’s just the possibility.”102
The detectives in the Anti-Bias Task Force were a specialized unit
who were specially trained to investigate hate crimes.103 For a variety of
reasons the detectives in this unit were committed to the investigation of
crimes motivated by bias.104 Over a 20-year period the unit had received
thousands of reports of hate crimes.105 Several hundred crimes, not all of
which were hate crimes, were sent to the specialized unit each year.106
Slurs and epithets were common occurrences in many of the crimes re-
ported to the unit.107 Center City is a city with a sizable minority popula-
tion, and many crimes had perpetrators and victims of different races.108
Classifying every crime whose initial police report included slurs and epi-
thets with interracial perpetrator/victim composition would not only have
been inaccurate, but also would have been unworkable.109 The large vol-
ume of crimes reported that included racist hate speech encouraged the
detectives in the unit to focus only on crimes that were actually motivated
by bias.110 Though none of them were lawyers, police detectives in Center
City were quite aware of the constitutional protection for protected
speech.111 Their comments suggested that they understood the doctrinal
lay of the land and that words in and of themselves were protected. As one
detective remarked: “Racial words are very violent. Racial words may be
hate incidents, but words are not a crime. He called her nigger? It’s not a
crime to say that — the First Amendment right may be violated.”112
Part of the officers’ reticence and the care they took with words stem
from the fact that police officers were very aware of the consequences of
convicting individuals of hate crimes.113 In this particular jurisdiction,
detectives believed that convictions for hate crime charges prevented indi-
viduals from being accepted into college and particular types of jobs, like
the police or the military.114 Several detectives talked about having used
slurs and epithets themselves in the past and felt that one should only be
102. Id.
103. BELL, POLICING HATRED, at 140-41.
104. Id. at 141.
105. Id. at 31-33.
106. See id. at 147.
107. Id. at 141.
108. Id. at 150-51.
109. BELL, POLICING HATRED, at 151.
110. See id. at 155-57.
111. Id. at 156-57.
112. Id. at 155.
113. See id. at 155-157.
114. Id. at 157.
SPRING 2015] There Are No Racists Here 363
charged with a crime in situations in which one had been motivated by
bias.115
B. Campus Hate Speech Codes
Although critics of hate crime legislation insist that it will lead to
punishment for the use of racist speech,116 courts may be more reticent
than critics believe to punish individuals for their use of racist speech.117
An attempt to safeguard the learning environment in the 1980s, universi-
ties developed hate speech codes, many of which were created after racist
incidents on campus.118 These incidents range from mobs of white UMass
Amherst students who chased and beat Black passersby after the 1986
World Series to incidents involving Black students’ dorm doors being de-
faced with slurs.119 Stanford University, the University of Wisconsin, the
University of Michigan, and scores of other campuses experienced a large
number of racist incidents and in response administrators created speech
codes.120
The codes were quickly challenged as infringing on speakers’ First
Amendment rights.121 Michigan’s policy—the first to reach the courts—
was challenged by a graduate student who mounted a facial challenge to
the statute.122 The student, Doe, was a graduate student who specialized in
the area of biopsychology, which he described as involving the study of
differences in personality traits and mental abilities.123  He argued discus-
115. BELL, POLICING HATRED, at 155-156.
116. See generally Terrance Sandalow, Equality and Freedom of Speech (Eighteenth Annual Law
Review Symposium: Demise of the First Amendment? Focus on Rico and Hate Crime Legislation), 21
OHIO N. U. L. REV. 831 (1995).
117. See, e.g., Jeannine Bell, The Hangman’s Noose and the Lynch Mob: Hate Speech and the
Jena Six, 329 HARV. C. R.-C. L. L REV. 350-51 (2009) (describing cases where the courts had
rejected the placement of a noose as part of an allegation of racially hostile work environment).
118. See, e.g.,  Jon B. Gould, The Precedent That Wasn’t: College Hate Speech Codes and the
Two Faces of Legal Compliance, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 345, 371 (2001) (arguing that the speech
policies were designed to counteract unpleasant racial incidents on campus); Doe v. Univ. of
Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 853 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (describing the adoption of a Policy on
Discrimination and Discriminatory Harassment of Students in the University Environment at the
University of Michigan in Ann Arbor in an attempt to curb what the University’s governing
Board of Regents viewed as a rising tide of racial intolerance and harassment on campus).
119. SAMUEL WALKER, HATE SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN CONTROVERSY
129 (1994) (describing incidents occurring at UMass Amherst, University of Wisconsin, Stan-
ford, and University of Michigan).
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1185 (6th Cir. Mich, 1995)
(First Amendment challenge to Central Michigan University’s “discriminatory harassment pol-
icy); The UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. System, 774 F. Supp. 1163
(E.D. Wis. 1991) (challenging the University of Wisconsin’s hate speech code).
122. Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 867 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
123. Id. at 858.
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sion of “controversial” theories on sexual or racial differences in one of his
classes might cause offense and lead to a complaint being brought under
the policy.124  In his challenge, Doe maintained that University of Michi-
gan’s policy on discrimination and discriminatory harassment was uncon-
stitutionally vague and overbroad and that it chilled speech and conduct in
a manner prohibited by the First Amendment.125 The Michigan policy
sanctioned “any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes
an individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orienta-
tion, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Viet-
nam veteran status.”126
Michigan’s policy was struck down by the district court on over-
breadth and vagueness grounds.127 The court first addressed the issue of
overbreadth.  Statutes that regulate expressive conduct or speech under the
First Amendment must be narrowly tailored to address only the particular
harm at which the statue is aimed.128  If a statute regulates a substantial
amount of protected expressive conduct or speech in addition to the evil at
which the statute is directed, it is overbroad.129  In reviewing the incidents
that had arisen to which the policy had been applied, the court noted that
the Michigan policy was not so clearly drawn so it could be interpreted to
apply to protected speech.130  Though no one had been officially sanc-
tioned under it, the court determined that the policy has been applied to
protected speech.131
Doe also argued that the Michigan policy was impermissibly
vague.132 Unconstitutional vagueness is present in statutes when, “men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.”133 To avoid
falling afoul of the vagueness doctrine, a statute must give clear guidance
regarding which behavior is protected and which is prohibited.  With re-
spect to issues of vagueness, writing for the court in Doe, Judge Cohn
maintained that the drafters provided clear guidance how one could avoid
being penalized by the policy:
. . .[T]he University never articulated any principled way to
distinguish sanctionable from protected speech. Students of
common understanding were necessarily forced to guess at
whether a comment about a controversial issue would later be
124. Id.
125. Id. at 856.
126. Id. at 853.
127. Id.
128. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973).
129. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
130. Doe v. Univ. of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 865 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 866.
133. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 607.
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found to be sanctionable under the Policy. The terms of the
Policy were so vague that its enforcement would violate the due
process clause.”134
After the Michigan policy was struck down, speech codes at Stanford,
Central Michigan University, and the University of Wisconsin were also
challenged and struck down.135
III. CASUAL RACISM: THE PROLIFERATION OF PROTECTED
RACIST EXPRESSION
Courts’ rejection of universities’ attempt to regulate racist expression
on campus may have not solely been a reflection just on how the judges
view the First Amendment landscape.  It may also have mirrored how ex-
pansively American society views one’s freedom to use racist speech.
Though when accused of racism almost everyone disavows being racist,
this section discusses the fact that large numbers of people nevertheless use
undeniably racist speech—slurs and epithets—in public venues.
A. Racist Expression on Social Media
The Internet has created a proliferation of spaces for racist speech.
One such locale is social media outlets such as Facebook and Twitter.  Ra-
cially charged and clearly racist tweets are so common on Twitter that
scholars have analyzed their location and character.136 In the wake of the
Washington Capitals’ 2012 playoff victory over the Boston Bruins, hun-
dreds of irate fans lashed out at Capitals player Joel Ward, who is Black, on
Twitter.  Ward had scored a game-winning goal in overtime.  Bruins fans
racist tweets included:
So fucking mad. That fucking nigger scored. . .
WHY THE FUCK ARE YOU SHOWING REPLAYS OF
THAT NIGGER SCORING. . .
We lostFalse To a hockey playing niggerFalse What kind of shit
is this. . .
134. Doe v. Univ. of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. at 867.
135. Order on Preliminary Injunction, Corry v. Stan. Univ., No. 740309, at *41 (Cal.
Sup. Ct. Feb. 27, 1995); Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1185 (6th Cir. Mich,
1995); The UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, 774 F.
Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (striking down Wisconsin’s hate speech code as vague and
overbroad).
136. Ugonna Okpalaoka, Map Shows South Has Most Racist Post-Election Obama Tweets,
GRIO (Nov. 12, 2012), http://thegrio.com/2012/11/12/map-shows-south-has-most-racist-
post-election-obama-tweets/ (reporting on the racist tweets posted after Barack Obama won the
2012 election).
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The Nigger scores again we riot.137
Sport fans engaged in similar behavior in 2014 when Montre´al Canadians
player P.K. Subban scored the winning goal against the Boston Bruins in
the 2014 Stanley Cup Playoffs.138 Thousands of racist tweets were directed
at Subban, who is also Black.139
Racist tweets are not, of course, limited to sports. Thousands of racist
tweets occurred in the wake of President Obama’s election,140 and also in
response to his Sandy Hook elementary school vigil.141 In a more local
example of government criticism, an investigation by the New York post
revealed that Lt. Timothy Dluhos, a Staten Island EMS supervisor, con-
stantly provided a running commentary of his job duties with racist and
anti-Semitic tweets.142 While giving a tour of a Bedford-Stuyvesant area
Black neighborhood, which Dluhos referred to as a “hood tour,” “he
posted photos of a housing project, fried-chicken joints, and a strip
club.”143 “Real nasty place,” Dluhos tweeted, “I’ve been there.”144 After a
groundhog bit New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg at a Groundhog
Day event, Dluhos tweeted, “Too bad he didn’t have rabies or AIDS and
too bad he didn’t bite King Heeb’s face off.”145 Dluhos was not fired.
One month after the tweets were publicized, Dluhos resigned.146
B. Racist Expression in the Workplace
The prevalence of racist expression in casual circumstances like social
media is unsurprising. In the workplace, however, the use of slurs or epi-
thets as harassment of an employee can be actionable. Title VII of the Civil
137. Bruins Fans Calling Joel Ward The N-Word, CHIRPSTORY.COM (Apr. 26, 2012 10:19
AM), http://chirpstory.com/li/6781. Several of these racist tweets were deleted a few days after
the incident but before they disappeared they were compiled and placed on Chirpstory.
138. Twitter Blows Up With Racist Reactions After P.K. Subban Scores Game Winner In 2nd
OT, CBS DETROIT, (May 2, 2014), http://detroit.cbslocal.com/2014/05/02/boston-strong-ra-
cist-reaction-after-subban-scores-game-winner/#.
139. Id. P.K. Subban Targeted By Thousands Of Racist Tweets After Habs Win (May 2, 2014),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/p-k-subban-targeted-by-racist-tweets-after-habs-
win-1.2629759.
140. Okpalaoka, supra note 136.
141. ‘Take that N*gger Off TV’: Racist Tweets Unleashed During President Obama’s Sandy
Hook Vigil Speech, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
12/17/take-that-nigger-off-tv-racist-tweets-obama_n_2317185.html.
142. Susan Edelman, FDNY EMS Lt. spews Racist, Anti-Semitic tweets, but cried when con-
fronted, N.Y. POST (Mar. 24, 2013), http://nypost.com/2013/03/24/fdny-ems-lt-spews-racist-
anti-semitic-tweets-but-cried-when-confronted/.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Susan Edelman, Whiner’s a Loser—Quits EMS, N.Y. POST, (April 28, 2013), http://
nypost.com/2013/04/28/whiners-a-loser-quits-ems/.
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Rights Act of 1964 forbids eligible employers from “fail[ing] or
refus[ing] to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of” his race.147 An employee
may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that his or her employer
subjected them to a hostile work environment.148 Courts evaluate whether
an objectively hostile work environment exists by weighing whether the
harassment the employee alleges is sufficiently pervasive to constitute a vio-
lation of Title VII.
Courts have based their determination of whether the conduct meets
the standards of racial-harassment by looking to the totality of the circum-
stances represented by: (1) how often the conduct occurs; (2) the severity
of the actions; (3) the level of physical threat or humiliation involved; and
(4) the extent to which the behavior affects employee’s job perform-
ance.149 Both the frequency and the nature of the slurs are factors in
courts’ determination that the racial harassment was sufficiently severe.150
A single allegation of a slur has been held to be not sufficiently severe.151
Not only that, the use of slurs and epithets must be sustained.  For in-
stance, in one case a plaintiff described having heard multiple racial slurs
over a fourteen year period.152 In denying his claim under Title VII, the
reviewing court characterized the slurs, which occurred at various points
over the plaintiff’s tenure, as “isolated and sporadic” because they only
occurred a few times each year over the fourteen year period.153
Characterizing the use of multiple slurs as not sufficiently severe con-
stitutes part of the space courts have created for the use of racially charged
expression in the workplace. The use of the slur “nigger” and racially
charged threats like “KKK” have been found by courts to be sufficiently
severe154 while stigmatizing language like the use of “ghetto” to refer to
147. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e–2(a)(1) (2014).
148. Kishaba v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 737 F.Supp. 549, 555 (D. Hawai’I 1990).
149. See, e.g., Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F. 3d 1238, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 529 U.S. 1068, 120 S.Ct. 1674, 146 L.Ed.2d 483 (2000).; Bailey v. Final Touch Acrylic
Spray Decks, Inc., No. 606CV-1578-ORL-19JGG, 2007 WL 3306749, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Nov.
6, 2007).
150. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F. 3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 1999).
151. See e.g., Smith v. N.E. Ill. Univ., 388 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2004).
152. Barrow v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 144 Fed. App’x. 54, 58 (11th Cir. 2005).
153. Id.; cf., EEOC v. FLTVT, LLC, 6:05-cv-1452, 2007 WL 3047136, at *5 (M.D. Fla.
Oct. 18, 2007) (rejecting a hostile work environment claim where numerous racial slurs were
used the workplace, but no one employee heard more than a few slurs, and most employees were
not aware of the slurs that the other employees heard).
154. See, e.g., Mack, et. al. v. ST Mobile Aerospace Engineering, Inc., 195 Fed. App’x. at
836-38 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding that racial slurs, along with graffiti depicting nooses, swastikas,
confederate flags, and the letters “KKK” were “severe”); Perkins v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 8 F.
Supp. 2d 1343, 1351 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (finding that “racial . . . pictures” on a bathroom wall, a
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African Americans has been viewed as lacking racial overtones and not
clearly motivated by racial animus.155
Title VII provides some remedy for individuals who experience ra-
cial harassment but that does not mean employers are always taken to task
for the use of racial slurs in the workplace. There is significant room for
employees to exhibit racist expression without being penalized under the
law. Courts have rejected occasional use of racial slurs, finding them be-
yond the reach of Title VII which is aimed at behavior that is pervasive.156
Racially tinged behavior has been characterized by courts as not signifi-
cantly severe.157  Finally, racist language and behavior not directed at an
employee may also lie outside bounds of Title VII.158
IV. INVISIBLE (RACIST) DANGERS
A. Hate Crime and its Obscuring Lens
Part of the difficulty of arguing that racist tweets and racist action in
the workplace is problematic has been the creation of the term hate crime.
If most Americans were asked about the typical hate crime, my guess is
that they would describe the dragging death of a Black man, James Byrd,
Jr.159 This widely publicized crime occurred in June 1998 in Jasper, Texas
and involved three white supremacists, Bill King, Russell Brewer, and
Shawn Berry, who chained Byrd behind their pickup truck and dragged
him to death.160
newspaper article regarding a lawsuit by black employees hung in the break room, and a clay doll
with racial overtones were “pervasive”); Hrobowski v. Worthington Steel Co., 358 F.3d 473,
477 (7th Cir. 2004) (repeatedly hearing the word “nigger,” including on more than one occa-
sion in which a fellow supervisor suggested that plaintiff talk to an employee “nigger to nigger”
was severe and pervasive); Rodgers v. Western–Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F. 3d 668, 675 (7th
Cir.1993); see also Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923, 927 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
155. Harrington v. Disney Reg. Entm’t, Inc., No. 06-12226, 2007 WL 3036873, at *11-
12 (11th Cir. Oct. 19, 2007). In another case, an employee alleged that she suffered numerous
discriminatory actions based on her race and gender that created a hostile work environment.  As
evidence of racial harassment, the plaintiff cited a coworker’s comment of “[g]reens for every-
body” following President Obama’s election.  The court found that considered alone, the com-
ment failed to rise to the level of severe or pervasive conduct required to support a case of hostile
work environment.
156. Barrow v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 144 Fed. App’x. 54, 57 (11th Cir. 2005).
157. See, e.g. Harrington v. Disney Reg. Entertainment, Inc., No. 06-12226, 2007 WL
3036873, *11-12 (11th Cir. Oct.19, 2007 (use of term “ghetto” not sufficiently severe).
158. E.g., Alexander v. Opelika City Schs., 352 F. App’x 390, 393 (11th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam) (finding an employee’s claim failed in part because supervisor’s discussion of how to tie a
noose around a person’s neck was not directed at the employee).
159. See Patty Reinert & Allan Turner, Jasper killer gets death penalty: A smirking King shows
no remorse, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 26, 1999, at 1A.
160. Id.
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Racial violence of this sort is not new, but calling it a “hate crime” is
a relatively recent invention.161 The term “hate crime” came into wide-
spread use after the creation of the 1990 Hate Crime Statistics Act.162 At
first, the flashy term “hate crime” lent attention to racial-motivated
crimes, like Byrd’s murder, which normally would have escaped the atten-
tion of the media. The categories of victims “protected” under hate crime
legislation grew as jurisdictions around the country created hate crime leg-
islation with categories including sexual orientation.163
With time, the term “hate crime” drew significant fire from scholars
opposed to the creation of ANY crime aimed at bias-motivation.164 In
response, many scholars adopted the term “bias crime.”165 This has not
fixed the problem; media outlets continue to use the loaded hate crime
terminology. Ultimately, the term “hate crime” prevents society from un-
derstanding the prevalence and magnitude of important incidents of bias-
motivated violence and may also even prevent us from taking seriously the
most dangerous forms of bias-motivated violence.
Our failure to deal properly with racist expression has created a host
of ills.  In addition to society’s failure to fully appreciate the harm directed
at targets of racist speech as the previous section describes, there are also
some unacknowledged dangers.  Many of these dangers are seemingly in-
visible stemming from the structures we have created to address racist vio-
lence in the manner we assume it to occur.
The term “hate crime” has big shoes to fill.  On its face the term,
“hate crime,” is violent and splashy, teeming with animus.  In many cases
to fully satisfy what we expect from the term “hate crime” we are uncon-
sciously looking for a crime that fits the profile of the dragging death of
James Byrd, Jr.—a violent dramatic murder committed by white
supremacists. To make matters worse, as the previous section suggests we
may be reluctant to pay too much attention to less showy crimes where
racist speech is used because of our worries about the criminalization of
constitutionally protected racist speech.  These two difficulties create a
perfect storm in which society tends not to see what is happening right
161. See, e.g., Robin Parker, Bias Crimes In The Schools-An Uncivil Education, 193 N.J.
LAWYER 20 (1998).
162. Hate Crimes Statistics Act, 23 U.S.C. 534 (1993), as amended by Act of July 3, 1996,
Pub. L.No. 104-155m s. 7, 110 Stat. 1392m 1394 (1996).
163. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, ADL APPROACH TO HATE CRIME LEGISLATION
(2001), available at http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/Hate-Crimes-Law.pdf.
164. See, e.g., Phyllis B. Gerstenfeld, Smile When You Call Me That!: The Problems With
Punishing Hate Motivated Behavior, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 259, 270 (1992).
165. JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW & IDENTITY
POLITICS 4 (1998) (describing the creation of the bias crime term).
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underneath our noses. This includes contemporary bias related incidents,
of which thousands occur each year.166
Though such crimes are underreported, and official statistics remain
inaccurate, there are multiple measures of contemporary bias crimes.167
The most comprehensive (though not necessarily the most accurate)
national list of bias-motivated incidents is compiled each year by the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI) from reports submitted by law-enforce-
ment agencies serving in cities and towns around the United States.168 In
2012, law-enforcement agencies reported 3,297 racially motivated bias
crimes to the FBI.169 Roughly two-thirds of these incidents (66.1 percent)
were motivated by anti-Black bias.170 The Southern Poverty Law Center
(SPLC) scans news reports and other media sources for bias-related activi-
ties to compile its catalog of hate incidents.171 The organization’s list in-
cludes more than 3,000 incidents occurring between 2003 and 2014.172
These incidents range from vandalism—slurs or epithets scrawled on
someone’s house, car, or religious institution—to bias-motivated mur-
der.173 Both the SPLC catalog and the FBI Hate Crime Statistics report
only scratch the surface of bias-motivated crime.
B. Anti-integrationist Violence
What does contemporary race violence captured within the hate
crimes label look like? Consider for example, one particular type of bias
crimes anti-integrationist violence—race based incidents directed at mi-
norities who have moved to white neighborhoods. I have created a
database of incidents directed at just over 430 non-white families or indi-
viduals living in white neighborhoods who have been targeted by anti-
integrationist violence—violence directed at non-white families whose
clear purpose was getting the targets to move.174 Such violence was identi-
fied in every geographic area of the country in both upscale and working
class neighborhoods.175 These attacks, described in court records and news
166. See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, INCIDENTS AND OFFENSES - HATE
CRIME STATISTICS, 2009, available at http://www2.Fbi.gov/ucr/hc2009/incidents.html.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. JEANNINE BELL, HATE THY NEIGHBOR: MOVE-IN VIOLENCE AND THE PERSIS-
TENCE OF SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN HOUSING 7 (2013).
170. Id.
171. See SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, HATE INCIDENTS, http://www.splcenter
.org/get-informed/hate-incidents?year=&state=all (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (detailing 3937
hate incidents).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. For a detailed description of incidents, see BELL, HATE THY NEIGHBOR, supra note
169 at 67, 69-72.
175. Id. at 69.
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articles, occurred between 1990 and 2010.176 They were directed at racial
and ethnic minorities who attempted to move to neighborhoods in which
most of their neighbors did not share their race.177 The incidents cata-
logued represented a range of offenses including arson, cross burning,
physical attack, racist graffiti, threats, and vandalism.178 Often, families and
individuals who were targeted suffered multiple attacks.179 Though Asian
American and Latinos were often attacked, the largest share of violence
was directed at African Americans.180
Some crimes occurred soon after the target moved to the white
neighborhood. Other crimes happened after the target had been living in
the area for some time. Irrespective of when the crime occurred, the per-
petrators motivation was clear—to get the individuals to leave.181 In one
representative case, Michael Ray Nichols and Shane Greene, who were
longtime residents of a neighborhood in Bessemer City, North Carolina,
were unhappy that Hispanics and African-Americans had started to move
to their (previously) all-white neighborhood.182 Several individuals re-
counted that Greene and Nichols screamed racial epithets at Hispanics and
African-Americans who lived in the neighborhood.183 On July 30, 1999,
Greene and Nichols attacked a neighbor, Julio Sanchez, and then began
walking down the street with a baseball bat and iron pipe yelling, “Go
back to Mexico. You done got all our damn jobs.”184 The two men then
began breaking windows and doors in the house and vandalizing the cars
as well.185
C. The Contemporary Extremist Threat
Though the vast majority of bias-motivated crime involves low-level
violence committed by individuals unaffiliated with hate groups, white
supremacists have by no means disappeared. The Southern Poverty Law
Center (SPLC), which tracks extremist activity, identified 784 separate ac-
tive U.S. hate groups—organizations that have beliefs or practices that at-
tack or malign entire classes of people, generally for immutable
characteristics—that were active in the United States in 2014.186 Such
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 67.
181. Id. at 69-72.
182. United States v. Nichols, 149 F. Appx 149, 150 (4th Cir. N.C. 2005).
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hate-map (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
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groups were located throughout the United States, in nearly every state,
and were engaged in activities ranging from leafleting and publishing to
murder.187
Many of the 3407 anti-race hate crimes identified by the FBI in 2013
were non-violent offenses—vandalism, simple assault, and intimidation.188
Extremists tend to be involved in much more violent crimes.  Hate
murders are frequently committed by those who have some sort of ideo-
logical commitment to ridding the world of the type of person attacked—
racial, ethnic, religious minorities and gays and lesbians.189 Hate crimes
scholars, Jack Levin and Jack McDevitt, refer to these as “mission”
crimes.190
1. Massacre at Emmanuel Church
Dylann Storm Roof’s mission was clear as the facts emerged regard-
ing his murder of 9 African Americans at Emmanuel African Methodist
Episcopal Church on June 17, 2015.  Witnesses told police that 21-year-
old Roof, joined the church Bible study at approximately 8 PM and then
roughly one hour later, pulled out a .45-caliber handgun.191  Roof told
the assembled group, “You are raping our women and taking over our
country,” before he began firing.192  He re-loaded the weapon five times
according to one witness.193
Friends and associates of Roof’s confirmed his hatred of blacks.194  In
addition to racist comments expressing support for segregation, Roof’s
friends said that he spoke of starting a race war.195 Several friends told
reporters that he had described hurting African Americans and doing
something “crazy.”196  On Roof’s Facebook page his profile picture
showed him wearing a jacket with two symbols popular with modern day
white supremacists—the flags of white-ruled Rhodesia and that of
apartheid-era South Africa.197  A picture of Roof holding a Confederate
187. Id.
188. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 2013 HATE CRIME STATISTICS, TABLE 4 OF-
FENSES, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2013/tables/4tabledatadecpdf/table
_4_offenses_offense_type_by_bias_motivation_2013.xls (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
189. JACK LEVIN & JACK MCDEVITT, HATE CRIMES: THE RISING TIDE OF BIGOTRY AND
BLOODSHED 89 (1993).
190. Id.
191. Richard Fausset, John Eligon, Jason Horowitz  & Frances Robeles, A Hectic Day at
Church, And Then a Hellish Visitor,  N.Y. TIMES, at A1 (June 21, 2015).
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193. Id. at 16.
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197. Frances Robles, Jason Horowitz and Shaila Dewan, Flying the Flags of White Power,
THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 19, 2015, at A1.
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flag, along with a racist manifesto, were found on his website, The Last
Rhodesian.198 There was also his choice of clothing.  The shirt Roof wore
constantly, according to friends, was a long sleeved grey shirt with a Bor-
der Patrol logo on one sleeve.199  Roof wore his Border Patrol shirt to the
Emmanuel church massacre.200
Contextualizing hate murders, like the Emanuel Church massacre is
important.  It is worth noting that though these hate murders are horrific,
murders are rarer than other forms of bias-motivated violence.  That being
said, there are reasons beside their brutality that we should pay attention to
them.  There is some evidence that the number of hate murders may even
be increasing, perhaps with a rise in the number of white supremacist
groups.201
My research reveals that between 1998 and 2012 there were 34 sepa-
rate racial extremist killing sprees, resulting in more than 38 murders.202
Though the precise facts of each incident are slightly different, hate
murders do share several commonalities.  The first is the issue of bias moti-
vation.  In the hate murders, the individuals killed were selected because of
their race, religion ethnicity, sexual orientation or other protected cate-
gory.  The perpetrator may go to a Black church where he is likely to find
the particular type of victim he wishes to target, as Roof did.
In other cases, the perpetrators were looking for a minority to kill,
and the victim just happened to be walking by.203  One excellent example
of this was the case of white supremacist Benjamin Smith.  On July 2,
1999, Smith shot at several Hasidic Jews in one neighborhood in Chicago.
Next, he drove to nearby Skokie, Illinois and shot killed a Black man,
Ricky Byrdsong, a former Northwestern University basketball coach.
Smith continued on to Urbana/Champaign, Illinois where he fired on a
group of Asian-Americans.  Smith’s killing spree ended on July 4, 1999, in
Bloomington, Indiana where he shot and killed a Korean graduate student,
Won-Joon Yoon before killing himself.204
The case of Benjamin Smith is typical of several other white suprem-
acist shooting sprees.  Though Smith was a follower of Matthew Hale, the
leader of the World Church of the Creator, a group dedicated to the eradi-
198. Rob Crilly & Raf Sanchez, Dylan Roof: The Charleston Shooter’s racist manifesto, THE
DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 20, 2015, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
northamerica/usa/11688675/Dylann-Roof-The-Charleston-killers-racist-manifesto.html
199. A Hectic Day at Church, supra note 191, at A16.
200. Id.
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203. See, e.g., R.L. Nave, 3 More Rankin Countians Sentenced for Hate Crime Against Black
Jackson Man, JACKSON FREE PRESS, (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/
weblogs/jackblog/2015/feb/25/3-more-rankin-countians-sentenced-for-hate-crime-a.
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cation of people of color, the shooting spree was not part of an organized
plan.205 Smith was a lone wolf.
Several recent hate killing sprees were committed by white
supremacists who were “lone wolves”—Eric Rudolph, Buford Furrow,
and Sean Gillespie.206 One very deadly killing spree committed by a lone
wolf occurred on August 4, 2012.207 Army veteran Wade M. Page, a
member of various racist rock bands, walked into a Sikh temple in Oak
Creek, Wisconsin and opened fire.208 Six Sikhs worshipping at the temple
were killed and three others were wounded.209 White supremacist organi-
zations use bands as a way of recruiting and furthering their message.210
The message band members sing is often one not just of hatred, but of
violent eradication of Blacks, Jews, and other minorities.211 According to
news reports, Page played in the band the “Blue Devils” and was the leader
of the white power band, End Apathy.212 One of the Blue Devils’ songs,
“White Victory,” included the lines, “Now I’ll fight for my race and na-
tion/Sieg Heil!”213
At the time of the shooting, Page had been identified by the South-
ern Poverty Law Center as a member of a band advocating race war, but
law enforcement had not had any encounters with him.214 Page’s activities
before the shooting were freely unfettered. Mark Potok, a senior fellow at
the Southern Poverty Law Center, said that Page had been known by the
Center for a decade because of his membership in rock bands known for
violent racist lyrics.215 The center, however, had not passed any informa-
tion about Page to law enforcement. Potok stated that “Page was just one
of thousands . . . . We were just keeping an eye on him.”216
2. Addressing Right-wing Extremism
Keeping tabs on individuals involved in violent hate groups is at odds
with some approaches to the First Amendment. Though it is typical for
205. See id.
206. Mike German, Behind the Lone Terrorist, A Pack Mentality, THE WASHINGTON POST
(June 5, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/04/AR
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the FBI and Department of Homeland Security to monitor violent ex-
tremist websites, this has been criticized.217 In 2009, several Republicans
in Congress expressed opposition to a Justice Department report called
“Rightwing Extremism” that suggested that the recession and the election
of a Black president could increase threats from white extremists.218  There
had been some cause for concern.  After Obama’s election there was a
significant increase in the number of threats directed at the President.
There were so many that it was overwhelming the Secret Service.219 De-
spite having an empirical basis for the concerns expressed in the report,
Janet Napolitano, then Secretary of Homeland Security, apologized for
any mistakes in the report and withdrew it.220
Aside from the political problems with monitoring extremists, their
new tactics make it more difficult as well. One former FBI undercover
agent assigned to fight domestic terrorism, Mike German, suggests that all
of these crimes committed by lone wolves who have been exposed to
white supremacist ideology are not a coincidence.221 German was embed-
ded in extremist groups between 1988 and 2004.222 Explaining the opera-
tion of such groups, he writes that extremist group leaders produce a
significant amount of literature—now available at hate sites online— that
describes “leaderless resistance” and lone wolf terrorism techniques.223
Such techniques are valuable because they insulate the larger group from
legal consequences stemming from the action of the lone wolves. These
tactics are especially important in light of Southern Poverty Law Center’s
civil rights suits bankrupting a number of Ku Klux Klan and white su-
premacist groups in the 1990s.224
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CONCLUSION
In an era in which no one admits to being a racist, white supremacists
who engage in hate murders seem weirdly anachronistic.  In some ways,
we only have ourselves to blame for our shock that such incidents can
occur.  It is our denial of the existence of racism which makes such inci-
dents seem as if they are wholly out of place in contemporary American
society.  As this Article has suggested, the picture of present-day America
as a place in which racism is never expressed is inaccurate.  As I have de-
tailed, there is significant First Amendment protection for racist expression,
and from social media to college campuses and the workplace there are
myriad spaces in which one can engage in racist expression without being
legally penalized.  There are however, limits.  The Court has allowed states
to use evidence of racist motivation in the punishment of hate crime.
I argue that we should not feel so comfortable with our approaches
to addressing bias-motivated behavior.  Our ideas about racial violence are
mired in the past. In our current era of racial tolerance, the term “hate
crime” has allowed many incidents of racial violence to remain hidden, at
least until it is too late. In this Article, I have discussed two ways in which
racial violence may be hidden amongst us.  Racial violence is hidden in
our neighborhoods, as minorities who moved to white neighborhoods are
targeted for violence. As a society, we should be much more vigilant
against the threat posed by extremist groups. Organizations like the South-
ern Poverty Law Center that track the activity of supremacist groups sug-
gest that membership in these groups is growing.225  Though extremist
groups do not commit the majority of hate crimes, when the deadliest
attacks occur, often the culprit has been a member of an extremist
group.226 For lone wolves like Dylann Roof, internet hate sites provide
both support and a forum to spread their views.
It is a mistake to think that because we have hate crime laws on the
books, our work addressing hate murders is done.  In fact, we do not need
hate crime legislation to punish these high profile attacks. Rather, hate
crime legislation is needed for the thousands of other bias-motivated at-
tacks that take place without national scrutiny. What might make a differ-
ence in preventing horrible hate murders is for the government, and for
everyone else, to take much more seriously the dangerous threats posed by
racial extremists.
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